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Introduction 
Small is not beautiful ever since WTO was 
established. Critics allege that the WTO rules 
are written by and for large multinational 
corporations. The micro, small and medium 
enterprises play a critical role in the 
economic evolution of the developing 
countries. State interventions are imperative 
to protect and nurture these sectors as well 
as to provide them a 'level playing field' in a 
globalised market, dominated by 
multinational corporations. Policy initiatives 
of national governments to protect their 
SMEs are branded as impediments to 
international trade. WTO, as the apostle of 
free trade, continues its tirade and sanctions 
to subordinate national laws and industrial 
policies to its trade rules that favour large 
corporations. Small and Medium enterprises 
are the prime beneficiaries of industrial 
incentives, subsidies, export assistance and 
foreign investment regulations in most 
developing countries. And WTO targets the 
SMEs as the candidates for killing. 
WTO and Third World Markets 
Reduction in tariffs and non-tariff barriers to 
trade among the industrialized countries 
were the prime goals of GATT. However, the 
focus shifted from developed country 
markets to developing country markets 
during the last few decades of the twentieth 
century. GATT without any enforcement 
machinery was powerless to force open the 
developing country markets. Therefore, GATT 
was transformed into WTO. 
International Trade Organization 
(ITO) 
At the Bretton Woods conference, convened 
to establish IMF and the World Bank, a third 
pillar of global economic governance was also 
proposed - the International Trade 
Organization (ITO). Like the other two, the 
trade organisation too was sponsored by the 
United States. However, the ITO met with an 
early death at the hands of the U.S. Against 
the wishes of the United States, ITO's Havana 
Charter included p rovisions to protect 
domestic industries in developing countries. 
As the provisions of the ITO Havana Charter 
were against the larger interest of the United 
States, the U.S congress refused to ratify the 
ITO Charter, thus effectively killing the 
organisation. It took another five decades for 
the U.S. to re-establish an international trade 
organisation - The WTO - in its own interest 
and image. 
GATT Trade Rounds 
GATT was established in 1945 as a temporary 
arrangement to regulate international trade, 
until such time that an international 
organisation could be established. Eight major 
conferences, called trade rounds, were held 
under the auspices of GATT. The first five 
rounds (Geneva 1947, Annecy 1948, Torquay 
1950, Geneva 1956 and Dillon 1960-61) were 
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aimed at tariff reductions. In these rounds, 
held during the first two decades of its 
existence, members of GATT focused on 
negotiations aimed at reducing tariffs (taxes 
on imported goods]. The sixth round held in 
Geneva (1964-67), named "the Kennedy 
Round" was aimed at anti-dumping and 
reduced industrial tariffs in the manufacturing 
sector among the industrial countries -U.S, 
European Economic Community, UK and 
Japan. The seventh round in Geneva (1973-79) 
named "the Tokyo Round" achieved 
substantial reduction in tariffs and non-tariff 
barriers to trade. Non-tariff barriers (NTBs) 
such as industrial subsidy, export credits and 
legislative codes and standards were 
introduced by governments facing depression 
due to the oil price hikes during 1970s. The 
average tariff on manufactured products was 
brought down to 4.7 per cent from 40 per cent 
at the time of GATT's creation. The eighth 
round, last and the most important (1986-
1993) named "the Uruguay Round," saw the 
establishment of WTO. 
GATT and Developing Countries 
Throughout the history of the GATT, there has 
been a major recurring theme: that the 
developing countries have not been able to 
obtain their fair share of benefits from the 
trading system. Developed countries had 
followed the policy of preventing imports 
from developing countries - agricultural 
commodities and textile and clothing, in 
particular. The Report of Habeiier Committee 
(1958), set up to study the complaints of 
developing countries, reported that high 
tariffs faced the exports of developing 
countries over a wide range of products -
vegetable oils, coffee, tea, cocoa, jute products, 
cotton products, leather goods and a variety 
of sophisticated manufactured products. 
The Multi-Fibre Arrangement (MFA) of 1973, 
introduced to restrict exports of cotton 
textiles from developing countries such as 
India, Pakistan, Sri Lanka and Hong Kong to 
the developed countries, illustrates how 
GATT legitimised big country barriers to 
developing country exports. Even at the end 
of the Tokyo Round (1979), twenty years 
after the Haberler Report, the trade barriers 
to commodities and products from 
developing countries remained more or less 
at the same level as the 1950s, and they have 
remained more or less at the same level even 
after the Uruguay Round. 
Need to Replace GATT 
By the early 1980s, the rich countries felt that 
the General Agreement was no longer as 
relevant to the realities of world trade as it 
had been in the previous decades. World 
trade had become far more complex; 
globalization of the world economy was 
underway; international investment was 
exploding; and trade in services and 
intellectual property - not covered by the 
rules of GATT - were of major interest to the 
advanced economies. 
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The GATT needed a replacement - more so 
because the U.S felt so. In spite of all the 
concessions demanded and obtained by the 
United States, GATT did not meet the U.S. 
expectations adequately. Tariff reduction and 
free trade meant that the U.S. now faced 
competition from the rejuvenated economies 
of Western Europe and japan. The U.S. was 
baffled by the relative decline in U.S. 
international competitiveness. The 
Americans found themselves losing out in 
traditional U.S. core industries such as cars, 
consumer electronics, and textiles and 
apparel, although they still had an edge in 
non-traditional areas: high technology, 
pharmaceutical and communication systems. 
By the 1980s, it become clear that the 
international trade system the United State 
had foririulated was no longer working solely 
in the interest of American corporations. The 
U.S. was also dissatisfied with the GATT's 
dispute resolutions process. 
Crisis in Corporate Profitability 
The final quarter of the 20th century was 
marked by a crisis in corporate profitability. 
The corporate sector was experiencing 
stagnation due to market constraints and 
limited investment opportunities. In the 
decade of the 1960s, the world economy 
grew at the rate of 5.0 percent. In the 1970s 
the real growth rate dropped to 3.6 percent. 
By the 1980s, the rate had dropped to 2.8 
percent and continued this decline in the 
1990s, when it fell to 2.0 percent.' Through 
the 1990s, the overall European 
unemployment rate remained in double 
digits, while the Japanese economy has been 
stagnating for a decade. 
The industrialised countries have 
experienced much slower economic growth 
in the post-1980 period than during the 
1950s and 1960s. During the 1960s, the 
OECD (Organisation for Economic 
Cooperation and Development) countries, for 
example, expanded at a rate of nearly 5 per 
cent a year. Between 1981 and 1990, the 
corresponding growth rate was 3.2 per cent. 
The economic growth rate declined further in 
the 1990s, i.e. about 1.5 per cent between 
1991 and 1994.2 The decline in economic 
growth in the recent period has not been due 
to the poor performance of just a few major 
countries, but has been more or less universal 
among OECD members: 18 out of 20 had a 
lower growth rate in the period 1980-1991 
than between 1960 and 1971. 
As a strategy for corporate survival, 
developed countries had to ensure markets 
and investment opportunities for their 
corporations in developing countries. 
Growing industrial development in third 
world countries, protection of infant 
industries in these nations, and their 
regulation on foreign investment offered 
serious threat to the survival and growth of 
corporations in developed countries. As a 
result, industrialised countries and their 
business lobbies have been making serious 
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efforts to create a favourable investment 
climate in the Third World countries. 
Economic stagnation in advanced capitalist 
countries and the corporate profitability 
crisis have been the prime reasons behind the 
drive for investment treaties, pushed by the 
institutions of global governance. 
Resistance by Developing 
Countries 
Initially, developing countries were fairly 
united and did not want to enter into any new 
round until the earlier promises were met. 
The unity among the developing-countrics 
was lost when Singapore used the 
opportunity of an Association of South-East 
Asian Nations (ASEAN) summit to convince 
other ASEAN members to agree to the U.S. 
demands for launching a new round, 
indicating the prospect that the ASEAN would 
get better market access. 3 Subsequently, the 
United States, Japan, Canada and the 
European Community began meeting with a 
group of developing countries, resulting in 
the Colombian-Swiss text for the 1986 
Ministerial meeting at Punta del Este. Al the 
same time, a group of developing countries, 
led by Brazil and India, stood up against such 
a round. 
Marrakesh Agreement to Establish 
WTO 
After seven and a half years of trade 
negotiations, the Uruguay Round negotiations 
were concluded in December 1993 and the 
Final Act of the Marrakesh Agreement was 
signed at the Marrakesh Ministerial meeting 
in 1994. It contained about 60 agreements 
and decisions, totalling around 550 pages. 
GATT chief Peter Sutherland had been 
pushing for a new institution to replace the 
GATT, and the Marrakesh Agreement 
established the World Trade Organization 
(WTO), with headquarters in Geneva, The 
Marrakesh Agreement, establishing WTO, 
with its annexed agreements, understandings 
and decisions, including GATT 1994, and a 
trade policy review mechanism for periodic 
"review" of the economic policies of 
countries, came into force on January 1, 1995. 
When the Final Act of the Marrakesh 
Agreement was signed, few in the developing 
i world, beyond members of a small circle o' 
officials and policy-makers in the arena of 
trade, were fully aware of its implications. 
Most countries were unaware of the range of 
obligations that was being assumed, the 
obstacles to development and the restrictions 
on economic policies that countries could 
pursue. 
Birth of a Super National Authority 
GATT was not an international organisation, 
but an inter-governmcntal treaty. Instead of 
"member states," GATT had "contracting 
parties." But WTO is an international 
organisation that administers multilateral 
agreements. New issues such as services, 
intellectual property and investment 
measures expanded the WTO's authority to 
[90] 
WTO and Development of SMEs 
subjects beyond trade. Whereas the GATT 
system made multilateral rules that affected 
only tariff and non-tariff measures, many of 
the WTO's agreements involve the domestic 
policies of member countries, The 'trading 
system' has become invasive, and it now 
affects some of the critical domestic policies 
that lie at the heart of national development 
strategy. 
WTO now restricts a country in subsidizing 
domestic industries and in adopting 
measures to encourage domestic firms and 
business; it prescribes the manner in which 
countries treat foreign investments and 
foreign investors; and it imposes on all 
member countries a minimum set of high 
standards for intellectual property 
protection. 
On violation of any WTO regulation by a 
member country, an enforcement process is 
initiated and consensus of members is 
required, not to implement sanctions, but to 
prevent them. WTO's strong enforcement 
mechanism, involving an integrated dispute 
settlement system, enables not only 
retaliation by one member country against 
another for failing to meet its obligations, but 
also cross-sectoral retaliation. If a developing 
country seeks exemption to protect its 
industries or farmers from foreign 
competition, it faces coordinated, punitive 
trade sanctions from all WTO members. 
In efiect, GATT has been transformed from an 
ineffectual chamber of commerce into a super 
national agency for restructuring the world 
market in the commercial and financial 
interests of the leading powers. A treaty 
organisation has been converted into a 
powerful enforcement organisation that 
imposes and legislates, not just trading 
relations, but also the domestic property, tax 
and subsidy regimes of its members. The 
enforcement mechanism ensures not only 
that its rules are followed, but also that 
developed countries could use WTO as a 
vehicle through which policies in their 
interest can be disseminated and enforced. 
Selected W T O Agreements and 
SMEs 
This section attempts to analyze the 
significance of the major WTO agreements to 
the development of SMEs. The WTO 
agreements under review include: 
1. Agreement on Subsidies and 
Countervailing Measures (SCM) 
2. Agreement on Trade Related Aspects 
of Investment Measures (TRIMs) 
3. Agreement on Trade-Related 
Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs) 
4. General Agreement on Trade in 
Services (GATS) 
Subsidies and Countervailing 
Measures Agreement 
The Subsidies and Countervailing Measures 
(SCM) Agreement establishes multilateral 
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rules or disciplines regulating the provision 
of industrial subsidies. Specifically, it 
describes the kind of industrial subsidies 
which are prohibited and also the situations 
where subsidies are actionable and hence 
could be challenged by other countries. It 
further provides for the use of countervailing 
measures or duties by countries to counter 
illegal subsidisation by another country. 
The SCM Agreement creates two basic 
categories of subsidies: those that are 
prohibited, those that are actionable (ie, 
subject to challenge in the WTO or to 
countervailing measures). All specific 
subsidies fall into one of these categories. 
Prohibited subsidies 
Two categories of subsidies are prohibited. 
The first category consists of'export subsidies'. 
Hence, any subsidy whose payment to the 
recipient is directly linked to its export 
performance is a 'prohibited subsidy'. 
Examples of such subsidies are given in Annex 
1 of the SCM Agreement). 
The second category of prohibited subsidies 
consists of 'local content subsidies'. Any 
subsidy that gives preference or encourages 
the use of domestically-produced goods, either 
as intermediate goods or for any other 
purposes, over imported goods, is a prohibited 
subsidy under the SCM Agreement. Such a 
subsidy will discriminate against the imported 
goods and hence impair the benefits that may 
have accrued to an importing country. 
Actionable subsidies 
These subsidies are not prohibited; however, 
they are subject to challenge, either in the 
dispute settlement body of the WTO or 
through countervailing action [imposing 
countervailing duty). However, such an action 
against 'actionable' subsidies can be taken 
only if the following condition is satisfied: the 
subsidies cause adverse effects to the 
interests of another country. 
Countervailing measures 
An important components of the SCM 
Agreement is the provision to impose 
countervailing duties. A countervailing 
measure is a trade-remedial measure, just 
like antidumping duties or safeguard 
measures. Countervailing duties are also used 
in situations where there is distortion caused 
to the domestic industry of one country due 
to a practice (illegal subsidisation) followed 
by another country. 
Subsidies usually provided to micro, small 
and medium enterprises in developing 
countries such as India come under 
prohibited or actionable subsidies. 
Investment subsidies to SSI units and 
enterprises in backward areas, tax holidays, 
sales tax exemptions, concessions to weak 
and sick units, measures to rehabilitate sick 
enterprises and industry wise incentives are 
examples of actionable subsidies. Incentives 
for investment in backward areas are also 
actionable. Such incentives by national, state 
or local governments or corporations or 
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institutions under the government are not 
allowed. Export subsidies and incentives to 
all types of institutions, traditionally provided 
to SMEs and other enterprises in developing 
countries such as India have been banned. 
Developed countries of today had used such 
subsidies earlier for the protection and 
development of their industries. These 
countries are now denying the same policy 
options to developing countries to nurture 
their 'infant industries.' 
A proposal submitted by the Government of 
India to WRO regarding the Agreement on 
Subsidies and Countervailing Measures on 
June 07,1999, pointed out the injustice:" The 
subsidies commonly used by developing 
countries for their industrialization ,a,pd 
development have been included in the 
actionable or prohibited category, while those 
used by developed countries are in the non-
actionable category. This is evidently not fair, 
particularly when viewed in the context of 
the fact that the subsidies presently being 
used by developing countries are exactly 
what were previously used as instruments of 
development by the developed countries of 
today. This demonstrates that these 
initiatives are indispensable for developing 
countries, especially those with small and 
vulnerable economies." 
The Indian proposal to WTO makes another 
pertinent observation: "These subsidies can 
enable developing countries to strengthen 
their industrial sector and diversify their 
exportable product, thereby becoming active 
participators in international trade. Where 
used, measures such as these have had 
extremely effective results in the creation of 
new industries, the attraction of foreign 
investment, the creation of direct or indirect 
jobs, the improvement of trade balances, as 
well as the development of less advantaged 
areas, all of which have contributed 
progressively towards greater economic 
development and social stability." 
Developed countries have been repeatedly 
bringing complaints for action against 
developing countries for providing incentives 
and subsidies. A recent example is the US 
complaint in 2007 against China for its 
several industrial subsidies.4 Developed 
countries have in fact forced most developing 
countries (including India) to withdraw 
industrial subsidies and export incentives. 
Withdrawal of such subsidies and incentives 
has been detrimental to SMEs, particularly 
micro and small scale industry sectors. 
How the SMEs have been affected by the WTO 
subsidy regime is indicated by the 
widespread protest being raised by SME 
industry associations in the European Union 
countries. For instance, small business 
leaders have been urging the UK's EU 
commissioner, Peter Mandelson, to press for 
an exemption to global trade rules which they 
claim are squeezing small firms out of the 
public procurement market. The Forum of 
Private Business (FPB), a lobby group which 
represents around 25,000 UK small firms, 
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claims that their members should be able to 
benefit from an exemption to international 
trade rules, which forhid the favouring of 
small firms in government procurement 
tendering. 
Trade Related Aspects of 
Investment Measures (TRIMs) 
The Trade Related Aspects of Investment 
Measures (TRlMs)Agreement was formulated 
under the assumption that existing 
investment policies (measures) in several 
countries restrict and distort trade. 
Prior to TRIMs, most countries had adopted 
policies designed to protect their economies 
from foreign competition by offering their 
domestic industries an opportunity to grow 
to meet international competition. The policy 
of development through import substitution 
imposed protective tariffs and subsidies for 
key industries. The SMEs have been the 
prime beneficiaries of such measures. 
Governments have often provided subsidies 
to local firms and imposed performance 
measures, such as local contents 
requirements to foreign investors, with a 
view to encourage investment in accordance 
with certain national priorities. These 
measures often required foreign investors to 
appoint local managers, to employ local 
workers in skilled positions, and to purchase 
inputs from domestic producers, as ways of 
ensuring technology transfers."' Measures 
were also adopted to restrict capital flows in 
order to increase the stability of currencies 
and to encourage both foreign corporations 
and citizens to invest within the country. The 
industrialised countries of today had imposed 
regulations on foreign companies to ensure 
that the new investments contributed to their 
long-term economic development. 
TRIMs Agreement applies to trade in goods, 
not services. The agreement requires that 
member governments do not apply any 
measures (TRIMs) that are inconsistent with 
the provisions of GATT Articles III: National 
Treatment, and Article XI: General 
Elimination of Quantitative Restrictions (i.e. 
quotas). An illustrative list of disallowed 
investment measures (TRIMs), is appended 
to the agreement. This list includes: Local 
content requirements, specifying that 
governments cannot require the purchase or 
use by an enterprise of products of domestic 
origin or from any domestic source. Trade 
balancing requirements, demanding that 
governments cannot require that an 
enterprise's purchases or use of imported 
products be limited to an amount related to 
the volume or value of local products that it 
exports. 
These are only examples of investment 
measures inconsistent with the agreement. 
Similar measures come under the purview of 
the agreement, as illustrated by the several 
disputes brought before the WTO panel and 
the verdicts on them. The TRIMs agreement 
requires countries to phase out such 
government policies. 
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A fundamental critique of TRIMs agreement 
is that the measures prohibited in the 
agreement are themselves essential policy 
instruments for industrialisation and 
development of Third World countries. The 
local content provisions in national policies 
favoured local SMEs. 
The strategy behind TRIMs agreement is to 
curtail the policy options available to 
developing countries to protect and foster 
local industries and enterprises. The major 
challenge is that the agreement seriously 
curtails the authority of the nation state to 
formulate laws and policies for the 
development of micro, small and medium 
enterprises. The TRIMs agreement specifies 
that any national laws or regulations that are 
not in consonance with its provisions need to 
be removed, and that the offending nations 
shall be punished with trade sanctions. 
The TRIMs agreement seeks to remove the 
rights and powers of governments to regulate 
foreign investments. The agreement further 
aims at facilitating investments by 
multinationals in the Third World, ensuring at 
the same time that these foreign companies 
get national treatment in the host countries. 
The strategic options include unfettered 
foreign investment opportunities for 
multinationals in developing countries in 
order to pre-empt the development of local 
industries. 
Agreement on Trade-Related 
Intellectual Property Rights 
(TRIPs) 
The aim of the Agreement on Trade-Related 
Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs) is to 
establish and institutionalize a worldwide 
intellectual property regime to protect the 
market interests of corporations in the 
developed countries, which enjoy monopoly 
in science and technology. 
The proclaimed aim of TRIPs is to strengthen 
and harmonise the protection of intellectual 
property rights at the global level. The TRIPs 
agreement covers both industrial property 
and literary and artistic property. While the 
first one deals with trademarks, patents, 
geographical indications, industrial designs, 
layout-designs and trade secrets, the latter 
covers copyright and related rights. The 
Agreement emphasises the idea that 
intellectual property rights are private rights, 
and they should be given effective and 
adequate protection to reduce "distortions 
and impediments" in international trade. 
TRIPs established a uniform set of standards 
for all countries, without giving due 
consideration to their level of development in 
socioeconomic conditions and technological 
evolution. It requires all WTO members to 
adopt in their national laws certain minimum 
standards for protecting and enforcing all 
forms of intellectual property rights. 
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Many developing countries had tried to resist 
the introduction of IPRs as a subject in the 
Uruguay Round. The TRIPs negotiations were 
thrust upon the developing countries with 
the U.S. threat of trade sanctions under 
'Special 301.' The U.S. government has made 
the rigorous enforcement of intellectual 
property rights [IPRs] a top priority of its 
foreign policy. For example, the U.S. 
unilaterally imposed import duties on $260 
million of Argentine exports in 1997, in 
retaliation for Argentina's refusal to rewrite 
its patent legislation to the satisfaction of the 
U.S. Many countries, such as India, Pakistan, 
Ethiopia and Brazil, have similarly faced 
Super 301 threats for their patent laws. The 
U.S. has also made it clear to other 
governments that the TRIPs is not sufficient, 
and in every ongoing trade negotiation, the 
U.S. is seeking stronger "TRIPs-plus" terms. 
Industrialised countries had two primary 
motives in pressing for TRIPs negotiations 
under GATT. First, the WTO regime will 
protect developed country exports through 
patents and other protective instruments 
from potential competition by way of 
domestic production in Third World 
countries. Second, countries refusing to 
comply with TRIPs standards could be 
subjected to trade retaliation by invoking 
dispute settlement mechanism of the WTO. 
Developing countries are overwhelmingly 
dependent on innovations made in the 
developed countries. Almost all intellectual 
property is in the hands of the developed 
countries. It is estimated that industrialised 
countries hold 97% of all patents, 
multinational corporations 90% of all 
technology and product patents, while 
developing countries have few inventors; the 
are mostly users. 
Allen Freeman observes: "IPRS have as much 
to do with trade liberalisation as the free 
transport of slaves...They are an absolute 
monopoly of the advanced countries: 0.16 per­
cent of world patents are currently owned by 
Third World residents.There is already a wide 
technological gap between rich and poor 
countries. TRIPs will exacerbate the 
technological divide. The effect of the 20 year 
period of a patent protection is to basically 
deny others from developing alternatives that 
would be cheaper.'1 
The TRIPs regime effectively curtails the 
industrialisation efforts of developing 
countries. The process of industrialisation by 
imitation has been forbidden. Historically, 
technology transfer played a key role in 
industrialisation, and a large part of this 
transfer took place through firms learning, 
adapting and modifying through reverse 
engineering the technologies used by others. 
The economic history of the industrialised 
countries bears ample testimony. A 
significant factor in their industrial take-off 
was the relatively easy access to cutting-edge 
technology. The US industrialized, to a great 
extent by using but paying very little for 
British manufacturing innovations, as did the 
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Germans. Japan industrialized by liberally 
borrowing US technological innovations, but 
barely compensating the Americans for this. 
And the Koreans industrialized by copying 
quite liberally and with little payment US and 
Japanese product and process technologies. 
This process of'technological diffusion' used 
by developed countries yesterday has become 
'piracy' today. 
Small and medium enterprises in developing 
countries that wish to make use a patented 
technology need permission from the patent 
holder, who do not grant the permission in 
critical industries, even if technology fees and 
expensive royalties are offered. Technology 
holders prefer to sell in foreign markets 
finished goods at premium prices, rather than 
technology. If they are willing tjo. transfer the 
technology, the cost is generally very high, 
making it impossible for most SMEs to 
acquire such new technology. 
Technology adoption has been an essential 
element in the industrialisation of the 
developed countries, and the agreement 
denies the opportunity to developing 
countries. The agreement is protectionist by 
design, and is not guided by the need to make 
technologies available on favourable terms to 
developing countries. The TRIPs agreement is 
meant to perpetuate technological 
dependence and obstruct the development of 
Third World countries, thus widening the 
knowledge and development gaps.7 
The intellectual property regime (TRIPs] 
under WTO is a subtle conspiracy not only 
against SMEs but also against the developing 
world. It denies the benefit of knowledge and 
innovation to developing societies that are 
striving hard to nurture local production of 
essential goods for consumption and human 
survival. It provides at the same time 
unfettered freedom and privileges to greedy 
corporations to charge exorbitant prices for 
products and technology. 
The purpose of TRIPs is not to promote free 
trade, but to enhance monopoly power. TRIPs 
goes beyond compensating innovators to 
institutionalise a monopoly for high-tech 
corporate innovators, most of them from the 
developed countries. Among other things, 
TRIPs provides a generalised minimum 
patent protection of 20 years; institutes 
draconian border regulations against 
products judged to be violating intellectual 
property rights; and contrary to the judicial 
principle of presuming innocence until 
proven guilty, places the burden of proof on 
the presumed violator of process patents. 
What TRIPs does is reinforce the 
monopolistic or oligopolistic position of U.S. 
high tech firms such as Microsoft and Intel." 
It consolidates the U.S. advantage in the 
cutting-edge knowledge-intensive industries. 
The TRIPs agreement promotes monopoly by 
transnational corporations; prevents access 
to essential medicines and other goods to the 
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successive rounds of negotiations. Once a 
country has made a commitment, the 
commitment cannot be withdrawn, unless the 
government agrees to provide compensation 
to the affected foreign corporation. The 
agreement calls for 'disciplining 
governments.' 
GATS further denies any incentives, subsidies 
or privileges to local service providers in the 
private sector. Such assistance for protection 
and development of local service providers 
would be treated as discriminatory. The 
foreign corporations can go to the court and 
claim damages for violation of their rights 
and for lost profit if any rules of the country 
or local government affect their business. 
Many service sectors in Third World 
countries are still in a formative stage, and 
they hardly have any supply capacity to 
provide services to the developed countries. 
The supply capacity lies almost entirely in the 
rich countries. The agreement, therefore, is in 
the interest of developed countries and their 
large corporations. 
The aim of GATS is to remove all entry 
barriers into public services, traditionally 
provided by the government. Once these 
sectors are opened up to private enterprises, 
foreign operators can enter. By preventing 
state patronages to local service providers -
most of them in the SME sector - the GATS 
paves the way for domination of local service 
sectors, much to the detriment of local small 
and medium enterprises. 
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poor; leads to private appropriation of 
indigenous knowledge and life forms. Most 
developing countries have in the past 
exempted agriculture, medicines and other 
essential products and processes from their 
national patent laws, but TRIPs regime 
has changed the situation. TRIPs is a 
protectionist device, and should have no 
place in an organisation that is supposed to 
be committed to liberalization. There is a 
growing demand from some eminent 
economists and from several NGOs to 
take the TRIPs agreement out of WTO 
altogether.1' 
General Agreement on Trade in 
Services (GATS) 
Another WTO agreement that affect small arid 
medium enterprises in the service sector is 
the General Agreement on Trade in Services 
(GATS). GATS makes it mandatory for WTO 
member countries to open markets in specific 
service sectors to foreign companies and to 
provide national treatment to these 
corporations. The agreement covers al! 
services - education, health care, electricity, 
water, sanitation, banking, tele­
communications, tourism, professional 
services, and so on. GATS is hostile to public 
services, treating them as, at best, missed 
commercial opportunities and, at worst, 
unfair competition or barriers to entry for 
foreign service providers.1 0 The agreement 
further establishes the basis for progressive 
privatization in all service areas through 
WTO and Development of SMEs 
Delivery of services normally occurs within a 
country and therefore GATS targets domestic 
laws, regulations and policies that 
discriminate against foreign service providers 
or limit their profitability. The agreement 
constitutes a serious threat to democracy. 
Above all, on behalf of the multinationals, the 
U.S., Japan, the European Union and Canada 
are pressing developing countries for 
guaranteed, irreversible access to more 
service sector markets. GATS is forcing poor 
countries to privatise essential public 
services such as health care, education, 
electricity and drinking water. The poor, who 
are least able to pay for vital services, are the 
ones who suffer the most. In reality, the GATS 
agreement has little to do with trade. Instead, 
it focuses on granting foreign companies new 
rights and privileges within the boundaries of 
Third World countries. Local SMEs in service 
sectors in developing countries would be the 
major casualties. 
Conclus ion 
Although supposedly a democratic 
institution, the WTO is dominated by the 
leading industrialized countries and by the 
corporations of these countries. Developing 
countries have little power within the WTO 
framework. The development goals 
articulated in the Havana Charter, the original 
framework for WTO, have been put aside. 
Powerful transnational companies are left 
free to engage in trade, investment and 
employment practices which contribute to 
poverty and insecurity. Many of the rules of 
the World Trade Organisation on trade, 
subsidies, intellectual property, investment, 
and services protect the interests of rich 
countries and powerful multinationals, 
while imposing high costs on developing 
countries. 
The primary purpose of these WTO 
agreements is to open up developing country 
markets for developed country corporations. 
Rules, regulations and policies used by 
developing countries for nurturing local small 
and medium industries, agriculture, and 
service sectors are the targets of attacks of all 
these agreements. The IPRs regime under 
WTO is meant to deny the benefit of science 
and technology for the development of Third 
World countries and to consolidate 
technological supremacy of developed 
country corporations. TRIMs will dismantle 
industrial policies in Third World countries 
meant to promote local industry, particularly 
small and medium industries, and will 
remove all barriers to investment by foreign 
corporations. GATS is meant to take over the 
growing markets for services in developing 
countries, including essential public services 
traditionally provided by national and local 
governments, and to nip in the bud the 
emerging service enterprises in the small and 
medium sectors, by abolishing local laws and 
regulations that favour local, small and 
public sector service providers. 
The economic paradigms of WTO actually 
represent the values and interests of global 
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corporations. WTO maintains that these 
values should supersede all other values. Any 
obstacle to global trade is viewed with 
suspicion. These "obstacles" are actually the 
laws of nation-states, laws meant to protect 
small businesses, environment, human rights, 
farmers, consumers and labour; they are 
meant to guard national sovereignty and 
democracy. The WTO views these as possible 
impediments to "free trade," and they become 
subject to challenge within closed WTO 
tribunals. Unlike other global bodies such as 
the UN, the WTO enjoys unique enforcement 
powers. Offending countries must conform to 
WTO rules, or face harsh sanctions, 
The final test of the WTO's success and 
survival will not be the volume of world trade 
or the extent to which trade barriers have 
been lowered, but whether and to what 
extent living conditions in all nations -
particularly the developing countries, which 
constitute three-fourths of its members -
have improved. However, the current bias 
towards rich countries and their corporations 
raises fundamental questions about the 
legitimacy of WTO. 
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